In response to Trump Succeeds Where Obama Did Not
I have great hope for the upcoming talks with North Korea, and I agree that the tone and setting are different than they’ve ever been before. That said, while there is a possibility of everyone getting what they want (and thus currently a sense of great optimism in the possibility by all sides, and a thrust of welcoming outreach as each party sets up for the talks), there remain quite a few conflicting, zero-sum core objectives that are likely to color the actual talks and their ultimate impact.
First among these is reunification itself. While reunification is a North and South objective, “reunification” looks very different in the minds of the two heads of state. These two nations remain at war because each of their governments is unwilling to not be the surviving entity. Further, reunification is China’s worst outcome. China is at times uncomfortable with the DPRK and sees a nuclear North as problematic, but ultimately, their needs are best met by having a divided Korea and a buffer state between China and US-aligned South Korea. North Korea is unlikely to re-align with the West regardless of North/South relations, and is unlikely to open itself up much at all.
Northern power is based on their own narrative and control of information. Strict adherence to this policy has given the Kim dynasty firm control over a starving population. Family reunification on any meaningful scale is likely to provide an infection of truth that might well topple their hold on the hearts and minds of the North Korean people. As such, hopes of reunification (even among families) seems hard to imagine.
Additionally, we have come to this place precisely because the DPRK is on the brink of developing a nuclear missile that can hit the US mainland. This attention and recognition was precisely the DPRK’s objective in building this weapon, and when the talks are over and the DPRK improves its situation from desperately starving to abject poverty through foreign aid, they are likely to realize once again that their best alternative is to tear up any nuclear concessions and go back to threatening the world with nuclear weapons.
What worries me is the only end to this loop is a sub-optimal outcome nearly everyone in the region. Imagine a world where the DPRK after successful agreements violates those concessions and returns to weapon production. The US strikes a deal with China that the US will destroy the weapons sites with force, but will allow China (not South Korea) to enter. South Korea bears the brunt of a conventional artillery barrage, but repels a DPRK advance – but at great loss of life. North Korea becomes either part of China proper or a puppet vassal state, likely ending the prospect of Korean reunification for at least the next 100 years. In order to gain China’s acquiescence, the US would likely have to agree to cede our heavy presence in the Pacific – greatly reducing the US footprint on land and water, and likely leaving South Korea, Taiwan, Australia and Japan to deal with China as the unequivocal regional hegemon.
And Trump may well like that deal. It protects the US from a nuclear threat (America first), moves the US back from our global posture (which he has said from the start is among his objectives), and in exchange for the US conceding regional hegemony to China (which he and many others see as merely a realistic eventuality), he is likely to get strong trade concessions that will benefit US industry in the short term. In the thousand year sense, China also likes that deal – with the US gone from the region, they return to their rightful place atop the Asian region- achieved through negotiations, money and Korean (not Chinese) blood.
So while all of that is good for the US and China, it may be a bit early to start handing out Nobel Prizes. The Trump/Xi version of Realpolitik is more likely to look like it did in the Franco-Prussian era- like two great powers carving out their spheres of influence. Perhaps I’m wrong. But we will see…